How a Kenyan Cleric Fathered the Crisis in Cabo Delgado

Background

Recent events in Mozambique, namely the battle for Palma and the ensuing chaos throughout Cabo Delgado, have put a spotlight on the ISIL aligned group Ansar al-Sunna, who have showcased their capabilities and propensity for extreme violence in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate in the region. Following a failed Wagner Group intervention and subsequent withdrawal in March 2020, Southern African Development Community (SADC) governments have deployed troops and EU nations, along with the United States, are committing military advisors to Cabo Delgado as the conflict sees a surge of activity unbecoming of a province that would not have been considered a hotbed of terrorist activity several years ago. The question remains; where did this insurgency come from and how has it managed to establish a formidable presence in this corner of the continent?

In the latter half of 2012 an outspoken and controversial Muslim cleric, Aboud Rogo, was gunned down under mysterious circumstances in a drive-by ambush on the streets of Mombasa. It has since been speculated that the killing, one in a string of murders of radical clerics in Kenya at the time, was an extra-judicial hit carried out at the behest of the Kenyan government. The government publicly denied any involvement in the killing but it is widely accepted that high-ranking officials likely arranged the operation through a clandestine group known as the Radiation Unit composed of police, members of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), National Intelligence Service (NIS), and paramilitaries from the General Service Unit (GSU).

The Ripple Effect

Rogo, a known extremist that spent much of his time and resources radicalizing and recruiting youth to join al-Shabaab in Somalia, was linked to several large-scale terrorist attacks in Kenya including the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi, as well as a two-pronged attack on an Israeli owned hotel and airline in Mombasa in 2002. The United Nations Security Council had placed sanctions on Rogo early in 2012 for “engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia,” due to his radical teachings and calls for violence at the Masjid Musa mosque in Mombasa. Throughout the year accusations linking Rogo to several low-level terror events in the country further boosted his infamy as a known supporter and abettor of al-Shabaab culminating in the targeted operation that claimed his life.

Followers of the cleric rioted in Mombasa after news of his death, showcasing the extent of Rogo’s influence; a threat that the Kenyan government knew it had to act to suppress or face the prospect of a homegrown jihadist network comprised of its own citizens. Crackdown on the rioters was swift, harsh, and in some cases, deadly. Following police raids and constant surveillance by the NIS, hundreds of proponents of Rogo’s ideology were reported to have fled the Kenyan coast with some fleeing to Somalia, others settling in Tanzania, and a group of followers sneaking into the northern Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado in 2015.

The Origin Of Terror In Mozambique

Cabo Delgado provided the perfect combination of factors for Rogo’s followers to recruit and push jihadist ideology and doctrine, despite much of the local population feeling alienated from their message. This relative ease of recruitment largely due to years of governmental neglect, rampant poverty, and the presence of large foreign oil companies, was further reinforced by a general understanding that the Maputo government served only the elite. The situation festered under the radar of the national government who ignored heeds from local officials in Cabo Delgado, alarmed at the use of violence by the group as they began a campaign of militancy forming training camps in the remote bush.

Today, Ansar al-Sunna has emerged as a significant security threat and destabilizing force to not just Mozambique, but the entire South-East African region. With the drawdown of the ISIL presence in the Middle East, it can be expected that without vested international cooperation to degrade the group and bring about economic and social conditions that deter the populace from their ideology, Cabo Delgado could be the first in a domino-effect of ungoverned spaces that fall under the control of jihadists and their allied groups.